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  • feedwordpress 23:29:34 on 2018/06/19 Permalink
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    My Senate Testimony 

    (image) Today I had a chance to testify to the US Senate on the subject of Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and data privacy. It was an honor, and a bit scary, but overall an experience I’ll never forget. Below is the written testimony I delivered to the Commerce committee on Sunday, released on its site today. If you’d like to watch, head right here, I think it’ll be up soon.  Forgive the way the links work, I had to consider that this would be printed and bound in the Congressional Record. I might post a shorter version that I read in as my verbal remarks next…we’ll see.


     

    Honorable Committee Members –

     

    My name is John Battelle, for more than thirty years, I’ve made my career reporting, writing, and starting companies at the intersection of technology, society, and business. I appreciate the opportunity to submit this written and verbal testimony to your committee.

    Over the years I’ve written extensively about the business models, strategies, and societal impact of technology companies, with a particular emphasis on the role of data, and the role of large, well-known firms. In the 1980s and 90s I focused on Apple and Microsoft, among others. In the late 90s I focused on the nascent Internet industry, the early 2000s brought my attention to Google, Amazon, and later, Twitter and Facebook. My writings tend to be observational, predictive, analytical, and opinionated.

    Concurrently I’ve been an entrepreneur, founding or co-founding and leading half a dozen companies in the media and technology industries. All of these companies, which span magazines, digital publishing tools, events, and advertising technology platforms, have been active participants in what is broadly understood to be the “technology industry” in the United States and, on several occasions, abroad as well. Over the years these companies have employed thousands of staff members, including hundreds of journalists, and helped to support tens of thousands of independent creators across the Internet. I also serve on the boards of several companies, all of which are deeply involved in the technology and data industries.

    In the past few years my work has focused on the role of the corporation in society, with a particular emphasis on the role technology plays in transforming that role. Given this focus, a natural subject of my work has been on companies that are the most visible exemplars of technology’s impact on business and society. Of these, Facebook has been perhaps my most frequent subject in the past year or two.

    Given the focus of this hearing, the remainder of my written testimony will focus on a number of observations related generally to Facebook, and specifically to the impact of the Cambridge Analytica story. For purposes of brevity, I will summarize many of my points here, and provide links to longer form writings that can be found on the open Internet.

    Facebook broke through the traditional Valley startup company noise in the mid 2000s, a typical founder-driven success story backed by all the right venture capital, replete with a narrative of early intrigue between partners, an ambitious mission (“to make the world more open and connected”), a sky-high private valuation, and any number of controversial decisions around its relationship to its initial customers, the users of its service (later in its life, Facebook’s core customers bifurcated to include advertisers). I was initially skeptical about the service, but when Sheryl Sandberg, a respected Google executive, moved to Facebook to run its advertising business, I became certain it would grow to be one of the most important companies in technology. I was convinced Facebook would challenge Google for supremacy in the hyper-growth world of personalized advertising. In those early days, I often made the point that while Google’s early corporate culture sprang from the open, interconnected world wide web, Facebook was built on the precept of an insular walled garden, where a user’s experience was entirely controlled by the Facebook service itself. This approach to creating a digital service not only threatened the core business model of Google (which was based on indexing and creating value from open web pages), it also raised a significant question of what kind of public commons we wanted to inhabit as we migrated our attention and our social relationships to the web. (Examples: https://battellemedia.com/archives/2012/02/its-not-whether-googles-threatened-its-asking-ourselves-what-commons-do-we-wish-for ; https://battellemedia.com/archives/2012/03/why-hath-google-forsaken-us-a-meditation)

    In the past five or so years, of course, Facebook has come to dominate what is colloquially known as the public square – the metaphorical space where our society comes together to communicate with itself, to debate matters of public interest, and to privately and publicly converse on any number of topics. Since the dawn of the American republic, independent publishers (often referred to as the Fourth Estate – from pamphleteers to journalists to bloggers) have always been important actors in the center of this space. As a publisher myself, I became increasingly concerned that Facebook’s appropriation of public discourse would imperil the viability of independent publishers. This of course has come to pass.

    As is well understood by members of this committee, Facebook employed two crucial strategies to grow its service in its early days. The first was what is universally known as the News Feed, which mixed personal news from “friends” with public stories from independent publishers. The second strategy was the Facebook “Platform,” which encouraged developers to create useful (and sometimes not so useful) products and services inside Facebook’s walled garden service. During the rise of both News Feed and Platform, I repeatedly warned independent publishers to avoid committing themselves and their future viability to either News Feed or the Platform, as Facebook would likely change its policies in the future, leaving publishers without recourse. (Examples: https://battellemedia.com/archives/2012/01/put-your-taproot-into-the-independent-web ; https://battellemedia.com/archives/2012/11/facebook-is-now-making-its-own-weather ; https://shift.newco.co/we-can-fix-this-f-cking-mess-bf6595ac6ccd ; https://shift.newco.co/ads-blocking-and-tackling-18129db3c352)

    Of course, the potent mix of News Feed and a subset of independent publishers combined to deliver us the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and we are still grappling with the implications of this incident on our democracy. But it is important to remember that while the Cambridge Analytica breach seems unusual, it is in fact not – it represents business as usual for Facebook. Facebook’s business model is driven by its role as a data broker. Early in its history, Facebook realized it could grow faster if it allowed third parties, often referred to as developers, to access its burgeoning trove of user data, then manipulate that data to create services on Facebook’s platform that increased a Facebook user’s engagement on the platform. Indeed, in his early years as CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg was enamored with the “platform business model,” and hoped to emulate such icons as Bill Gates (who built the Windows platform) or Steve Jobs (who later built the iOS/app store platform).

    However, Facebook’s core business model of advertising, driven as it is by the brokerage of its users’ personal information, stood in conflict with Zuckerberg’s stated goal of creating a world-beating platform. By their nature, platforms are places where third parties can create value. They do so by leveraging the structure, assets, and distribution inherent to the platform. In the case of Windows, for example, developers capitalized on Microsoft’s well-understood user interface, its core code base, and its massive adoption by hundreds of millions of computer users. Bill Gates famously defined a successful platform as one that creates more value for the ecosystem that gathers around it than for the platform itself. By this test – known as the Gates Line – Facebook’s early platform fell far short. Developers who leveraged access to Facebook’s core asset – its user data – failed to make enough advertising revenue to be viable, because Facebook (and its advertisers) would always preference Facebook’s own advertising inventory over that of its developer partners. In retrospect, it’s now commonly understood in the Valley that Facebook’s platform efforts were a failure in terms of creating a true ecosystem of value, but a success in terms of driving ever more engagement through Facebook’s service.

    For an advertising-based business model, engagement trumps all other possible metrics. As it grew into one of the most successful public companies in the history of business, Facebook nimbly identified the most engaging portions of its developer ecosystem, incorporated those ideas into its core services, and became a ruthlessly efficient acquirer and manipulator of its users’ engagement. It then processed that engagement into advertising opportunities, leveraging its extraordinary data assets in the process. Those advertising opportunities drew millions of advertisers large and small, and built the business whose impact we now struggle to understand.

    To truly understand the impact of Facebook on our culture, we must first understand the business model it employs. Interested observers of Facebook will draw ill-informed conclusions about the company absent a deep comprehension of its core driver – the business of personalized advertising. I have written extensively on this subject, but a core takeaway is this: The technology infrastructure that allows companies like Facebook to identify exactly the right message to put in front of exactly the right person at exactly the right time are, in all aspects of the word, marvelous. But the externalities of manufacturing attention and selling it to the highest bidder have not been fully examined by our society. (Examples: https://shift.newco.co/its-the-advertising-model-stupid-b843cd7edbe9 ; https://shift.newco.co/its-the-advertising-model-stupid-b843cd7edbe9 ; https://shift.newco.co/lost-context-how-did-we-end-up-here-fd680c0cb6da ; https://battellemedia.com/archives/2013/11/why-the-banner-ad-is-heroic-and-adtech-is-our-greatest-technology-artifact ; https://shift.newco.co/do-big-advertisers-even-matter-to-the-platforms-9c8ccfe6d3dc )

    The Cambridge Analytica scandal has finally focused our attention on these externalities, and we should use this opportunity to go beyond the specifics of that incident, and consider the broader implications. The “failure” of Facebook’s Platform initiative is not a failure of the concept of an open platform. It is instead a failure by an immature, blinkered company (Facebook) to properly govern its own platform, as well as a failure of our own regulatory oversight to govern the environment in which Facebook operates. Truly open platforms are regulated by the platform creator in a way that allows for explosive innovation (see the Gates Line) and shared value creation. (Examples: https://shift.newco.co/its-not-the-platforms-that-need-regulation-2f55177a2297 ; https://shift.newco.co/memo-to-techs-titans-please-remember-what-it-was-like-to-be-small-d6668a8fa630)

    The absolutely wrong conclusion to draw from the Cambridge Analytica scandal is that entities like Facebook must build ever-higher walls around their services and their data. In fact, the conclusion should be the opposite. A truly open society should allow individuals and properly governed third parties to share their data so as to create a society of what Nobel laureate Edmond Phelps calls “mass flourishing.” My own work now centers on how our society might shift what I call the “social architecture of data” from one where the control, processing and value exchange around data is managed entirely by massive, closed entities like Facebook, to one where individuals and their contracted agents manage that process themselves. (Examples: https://shift.newco.co/are-we-dumb-terminals-86f1e1315a63 ; https://shift.newco.co/facebook-tear-down-this-wall-400385b7475d ; https://shift.newco.co/how-facebook-google-amazon-and-their-peers-could-change-techs-awful-narrative-9a758516210a ; https://shift.newco.co/on-facebook-a156710f2679 ; https://battellemedia.com/archives/2014/03/branded-data-preferences )

    Another mistaken belief to emerge from the Cambridge Analytica scandal is that any company, no matter how powerful, well intentioned, or intelligent, can by itself “fix” the problems the scandal has revealed. Facebook has grown to a size, scope, and impact on our society that outstrips its ability to manage the externalities it has created. To presume otherwise is to succumb to arrogance, ignorance, or worse. The bald truth is this: Not even Mark Zuckerberg understands how Facebook works, nor does he comprehend its impact on our society. (Examples: https://shift.newco.co/we-allowed-this-to-happen-were-sorry-we-need-your-help-e26ed0bc87ac ; https://shift.newco.co/i-apologize-d5c831ce0690 ; https://shift.newco.co/facebooks-data-trove-may-well-determine-trump-s-fate-71047fd86921 ; https://shift.newco.co/its-time-to-ask-ourselves-how-tech-is-changing-our-kids-and-our-future-2ce1d0e59c3c )

    Another misconception: Facebook does not “sell” its data to any third parties. While Facebook may not sell copies of its data to these third parties, it certainly sells leases to that data, and this distinction bears significant scrutiny. The company may not wish to be understood as such, but it is most certainly the largest data broker in the history of the data industry.

    Lastly, the Cambridge Analytica scandal may seem to be entirely about a violation of privacy, but to truly understand its impact, we must consider the implications relating to future economic innovation. Facebook has used the scandal as an excuse to limit third party data sharing across and outside its platform. While this seems logical on first glance, it is in fact destructive to long term economic value creation.

    So what might be done about all of this? While I understand the lure of sweeping legislation that attempts to “cure” the ills of technological progress, such approaches often have their own unexpected consequences. For example, the EU’s adoption of GDPR, drafted to limit the power of companies like Facebook, may in fact only strengthen that company’s grip on its market, while severely limiting entrepreneurial innovation in the process (Example: https://shift.newco.co/how-gdpr-kills-the-innovation-economy-844570b70a7a )

    As policy makers and informed citizens, we should strive to create a flexible, secure, and innovation friendly approach to data governance that allows for maximum innovation while also insuring maximum control over the data by all effected parties, including individuals, and importantly, the beneficiaries of future innovation yet conceived and created. To play forward the current architecture of data in our society – where most of the valuable information is controlled by an increasingly small oligarchy of massive corporations – is to imagine a sterile landscape hostile to new ideas and mass flourishing.

    Instead, we must explore a world governed by an enlightened regulatory framework that encourages data sharing, high standards of governance, and maximum value creation, with the individual at the center of that value exchange. As I recently wrote: “Imagine … you can download your own Facebook or Amazon “token,” a magic data coin containing not only all the useful data and insights about you, but a control panel that allows you to set and revoke permissions around that data for any context. You might pass your Amazon token to Walmart, set its permissions to “view purchase history” and ask Walmart to determine how much money it might have saved you had you purchased those items on Walmart’s service instead of Amazon. You might pass your Facebook token to Google, set the permissions to compare your social graph with others across Google’s network, and then ask Google to show you search results based on your social relationships. You might pass your Google token to a startup that already has your genome and your health history, and ask it to munge the two in case your 20-year history of searching might infer some insights into your health outcomes. This might seem like a parlor game, but this is the kind of parlor game that could unleash an explosion of new use cases for data, new startups, new jobs, and new economic value.”

    It is our responsibility to examine our current body of legislation as it relates to how corporations such as Facebook impact the lives of consumers and the norms of our society overall. Much of the argument around this issue turns on the definition of “consumer harm” under current policy. Given that data is non-rivalrous and services such as Facebook are free of charge, it is often presumed there is no harm to consumers (or by extension, to society) in its use. This also applies to arguments about antitrust enforcement. I think our society will look back on this line of reasoning as deeply flawed once we evolve to an understanding of data as equal to – or possibly even more valuable than – monetary currency.

    Most observers of technology agree that data is a new class of currency in society, yet we continue to struggle to understand its impact, and how best to govern it. The manufacturing of data into currency is the main business of Facebook and countless other information age businesses. Currently the only participatory right in this value creation for a user of these services is to A/engage with the services offered and B/purchase the stock of the company offering the services. Neither of these options affords the user – or society – compensation commensurate with the value created for the firm. We can and must do better as a society, and we can and must expect more of our business leaders.

    (More: https://shift.newco.co/its-time-for-platforms-to-come-clean-on-political-advertising-69311f582955 ; https://shift.newco.co/come-on-what-did-you-think-they-do-with-your-data-396fd855e7e1 ; https://shift.newco.co/tech-is-public-enemy-1-so-now-what-dee0c0cc40fe ; https://shift.newco.co/why-is-amazons-go-not-bodega-2-0-6f148075afd5 ; https://shift.newco.co/predictions-2017-cfe0806bed84 ; https://shift.newco.co/the-automatic-weapons-of-social-media-3ccce92553ad )

    Respectfully submitted,

    John Battelle

    Ross, California

    June 17, 2018

     
  • feedwordpress 23:59:30 on 2018/06/01 Permalink
    Tags: , , , , crypto, , , , , , , , , , , , world wide web   

    Do We Want A Society Built On The Architecture of Dumb Terminals? 

    The post Do We Want A Society Built On The Architecture of Dumb Terminals? appeared first on John Battelle's Search Blog.

    God, “innovation.” First banalized by undereducated entrepreneurs in the oughts, then ground to pablum by corporate grammarians over the past decade, “innovation” – at least when applied to business – deserves an unheralded etymological death.

    But.

    This will be a post about innovation. However, whenever I feel the need to peck that insipid word into my keyboard, I’m going to use some variant of the verb “to flourish” instead. Blame Nobel laureate Edmond Phelps for this: I recently read his Mass Flourishing, which outlines the decline of western capitalism, and I find its titular terminology far less annoying.

    So flourishing it will be.

    In his 2013 work, Phelps (who received the 2006 Nobel in economics) credits mass participation in a process of innovation (sorry, there’s that word again) as central to mass flourishing, and further argues – with plenty of economic statistics to back him up – that it’s been more than a full generation since we’ve seen mass flourishing in any society. He writes:

    …prosperity on a national scale—mass flourishing—comes from broad involvement of people in the processes of innovation: the conception, development, and spread of new methods and products—indigenous innovation down to the grassroots. This dynamism may be narrowed or weakened by institutions arising from imperfect understanding or competing objectives. But institutions alone cannot create it. Broad dynamism must be fueled by the right values and not too diluted by other values.

    Phelps argues the last “mass flourishing” economy was the 1960s in the United States (with a brief but doomed resurgence during the first years of the open web…but that promise went unfulfilled). And he warns that “nations unaware of how their prosperity is generated may take steps that cost them much of their dynamism.” Phelps further warns of a new kind of corporatism, a “techno nationalism” that blends state actors with corporate interests eager to collude with the state to cement market advantage (think Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich).

    These warnings were proffered largely before our current debate about the role of the tech giants now so dominant in our society. But it sets an interesting context and raises important questions. What happens, for instance, when large corporations capture the regulatory framework of a nation and lock in their current market dominance (and, in the case of Big Tech, their policies around data use?).

    I began this post with Phelps to make a point: The rise of massive data monopolies in nearly every aspect of our society is not only choking off shared prosperity, it’s also blinkered our shared vision for the kind of future we could possibly inhabit, if only we architect our society to enable it. But to imagine a different kind of future, we first have to examine the present we inhabit.

    The Social Architecture of Data 

    I use the term “architecture” intentionally, it’s been front of mind for several reasons. Perhaps the most difficult thing for any society to do is to share a vision of the future, one that a majority might agree upon. Envisioning the future of a complex living system – a city, a corporation, a nation – is challenging work, work we usually outsource to trusted institutions like government, religions, or McKinsey (half joking…).

    But in the past few decades, something has changed when it comes to society’s future vision. Digital technology became synonymous with “the future,” and along the way, we outsourced that future to the most successful corporations creating digital technology. Everything of value in our society is being transformed into data, and extraordinary corporations have risen which refine that data into insight, knowledge, and ultimately economic power. Driven as they are by this core commodity of data, these companies have acted to cement their control over it.

    This is not unusual economic behavior, in fact, it’s quite predictable. So predictable, in fact, that it’s developed its own structure – an architecture, if you will, of how data is managed in today’s information society. I’ve a hypothesis about this architecture – unproven at this point (as all are) – but one I strongly suspect is accurate. Here’s how it might look on a whiteboard:

    We “users” deliver raw data to a service provider, like Facebook or Google, which then captures, refines, processes, and delivers that data back as services to us. The social contract we make is captured in these services’ Terms of Services – we may “own” the data, but for all intents and purposes, the power over that information rests with the platform. The user doesn’t have a lot of creative license to do much with that data he or she “owns” – it lives on the platform, and the platform controls what can be done with it.

    Now, if this sounds familiar, you’re likely a student of early computing architectures. Back before the PC revolution, most data, refined or not, lived on a centralized platform known as a mainframe. Nearly all data storage and compute processing occurred on the mainframe. Applications and services were broadcast from the mainframe back to “dumb terminals,” in front of which early knowledge workers toiled. Here’s a graph of that early mainframe architecture:

     

    This mainframe architecture had many drawbacks – a central point of failure chief among them, but perhaps its most damning characteristic was its hierarchical, top down architecture. From an user’s point of view, all the power resided at the center. This was great if you ran IT at a large corporation, but suffice to say the mainframe architecture didn’t encourage creativity or a flourishing culture.

    The mainframe architecture was supplanted over time with a “client server” architecture, where processing power migrated from the center to the edge, or node. This was due in large part to the rise the networked personal computer (servers were used  for storing services or databases of information too large to fit on PCs). Because they put processing power and data storage into the hands of the user, PCs became synonymous with a massive increase in productivity and creativity (Steve Jobs called them “bicycles for the mind.”) With the PC revolution power transferred from the “platform” to the user – a major architectural shift.

    The rise of networked personal computers became the seedbed for the world wide web, which had its own revolutionary architecture. I won’t trace it here (many good books exist on the topic), but suffice to say the core principle of the early web’s architecture was its distributed nature. Data was packetized and distributed independent of where (or how) it might be processed. As more and more “web servers” came online, each capable of processing data as well as distributing it, the web became a tangled, hot mess of interoperable computing resources. What mattered wasn’t the pipes or the journey of the data, but the service created or experienced by the user at the point of that service delivery, which in the early days was of course a browser window (later on, those points of delivery became smartphone apps and more).

    If you were to attempt to map the social architecture of data in the early web, your map would look a lot like the night sky – hundreds of millions of dots scattered in various constellations across the sky, each representing a node where data might be shared, processed, and distributed. In those early days the ethos of the web was that data should be widely shared between consenting parties so it might be “mixed and mashed” so as to create new products and services. There was no “mainframe in the sky” anymore – it seemed everyone on the web had equal and open opportunities to create and exchange value.

    This is why the late 1990s through mid oughts were a heady time in the web world – nearly any idea could be tried out, and as the web evolved into a more robust set of standards, one could be forgiven for presuming that the open, distributed nature of the web would inform its essential social architecture.

    But as web-based companies began to understand the true value of controlling vast amounts of data, that dream began to fade. As we grew addicted to some of the most revelatory web services – first Google search, then Amazon commerce, then Facebook’s social dopamine – those companies began to centralize their data and processing policies, to the point where we are now: Fearing these giants’ power over us, even as we love their products and services.

    An Argument for Mass Flourishing

    So where does that leave us if we wish to heed the concerns of Professor Phelps? Well, let’s not forget his admonition: “nations unaware of how their prosperity is generated may take steps that cost them much of their dynamism.” My hypothesis is simply this: Adopting a mainframe architecture for our most important data – our intentions (Google), our purchases (Amazon), our communications and social relationships (Facebook) – is not only insane, it’s also massively deprecative of future innovation (damn, sorry, but sometimes the word fits). In Facebook, Tear Down This Wall, I argued:

    … it’s impossible for one company to fabricate reality for billions of individuals independent of the interconnected experiences and relationships that exist outside of that fabricated reality. It’s an utterly brittle product model, and it’s doomed to fail. Banning third party agents from engaging with Facebook’s platform insures that the only information that will inform Facebook will be derived from and/or controlled by Facebook itself. That kind of ecosystem will ultimately collapse on itself. No single entity can manage such complexity. It presumes a God complex.

    So what might be a better architecture? I hinted at it in the same post:

    Facebook should commit itself to being an open and neutral platform for the exchange of value across not only its own services, but every service in the world.

    In other words, free the data, and let the user decide what do to with it. I know how utterly ridiculous this sounds, in particular to anyone reading from Facebook proper, but I am convinced that this is the only architecture for data that will allow a massively flourishing society.

    Now this concept has its own terminology: Data portability.  And this very concept is enshrined in the EU’s GDPR legislation, which took effect one week ago. However, there’s data portability, and then there’s flourishing data portability – and the difference between the two really matters. The GDPR applies only to data that a user *gives* to a service, not data *co-created* with that service. You also can’t gather any insights the service may have inferred about you based on the data you either gave or co-created with it. Not to mention, none of that data is exported in a machine readable fashion, essentially limiting its utility.

    But imagine if that weren’t the case. Imagine instead you can download your own Facebook or Amazon “token,” a magic data coin containing not only all the useful data and insights about you, but a control panel that allows you to set and revoke permissions around that data for any context. You might pass your Amazon token to Walmart, set its permissions to “view purchase history” and ask Walmart to determine how much money it might have saved you had you purchased those items on Walmart’s service instead of Amazon. You might pass your Facebook token to Google, set the permissions to compare your social graph with others across Google’s network, and then ask Google to show you search results based on your social relationships. You might pass your Google token to a startup that already has your genome and your health history, and ask it to munge the two in case your 20-year history of searching might infer some insights into your health outcomes.

    This might seem like a parlor game, but this is the kind of parlor game that could unleash an explosion of new use cases for data, new startups, new jobs, and new economic value. Tokens would (and must) have auditing, trust, value exchange, and the like built in (I tried to write this entire post without mentioned blockchain, but there, I just did it), but presuming they did, imagine what might be built if we truly set the data free, and instead of outsourcing its power and control to massive platforms, we took that power and control and, just like we did with the PC and the web, pushed it to the edge, to the node…to ourselves?

    I rather like the sound of that, and I suspect Mssr. Phelps would as well. Now, how might we get there? I’ve no idea, but exploring possible paths certainly sounds like an interesting project…

    The post Do We Want A Society Built On The Architecture of Dumb Terminals? appeared first on John Battelle's Search Blog.

     
  • feedwordpress 19:30:31 on 2018/05/25 Permalink
    Tags: , , , , GDPR, , , ,   

    GDPR Ain’t Helping Anyone In The Innovation Economy 

    The post GDPR Ain’t Helping Anyone In The Innovation Economy appeared first on John Battelle's Search Blog.

    (image)

    It’s somehow fitting that today, May 25th, marks my return to writing here on Searchblog, after a long absence driven in large part by the launch of NewCo Shift as a publication on Medium more than two years ago. Since then Medium has deprecated its support for publications (and abandoned its original advertising model), and I’ve soured even more than usual on “platforms,” whether they be well intentioned (as I believe Medium is) or indifferent and fundamentally bad for publishing (as I believe Facebook to be).

    So when I finally sat down to write something today, an ingrained but rusty habit re-emerged. For the past two years I’ve opened a clean, white page in Medium to write an essay, but today I find myself once again coding sentences into the backend of my WordPress site.

    Searchblog has been active for 15 years – nearly forever in Internet time. It looks weary and crusty and overgrown, but it still stands upright, and soon it’ll be getting a total rebuild, thanks to the folks at WordPress. I’ll also be moving NewCo Shift to a WordPress site – we’ll keep our presence on Medium mainly as a distribution point, which is pretty much all “platforms” are good for as it relates to publishers, in my opinion.

    So why is today a fitting day to return to the open web as my main writing outlet? Well, May 25th is the day the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) goes into effect. It’s more likely than not that any reader of mine already knows all about GDPR, but for those who don’t, it’s the most significant new framework for data regulation in recent history. Not only does every company that does business with an EU citizen have to comply with GDPR, but most major Internet companies (like Google, Facebook, etc) have already announced they intend to export the “spirit” of GDPR to all of their customers, regardless of their physical location. Given that most governments still don’t know how to think about data as a social or legal asset, GDPR is likely the most important new social contract between consumers, business, and government in the Internet’s history. And to avoid burying the lead, I think it stinks for nearly all Internet companies, save the biggest ones.

    That’s a pretty sweeping statement, and I’m not prepared to entirely defend it today, but I do want to explain why I’ve come to this conclusion. Before I do, however, it’s worth laying out the fundamental principles driving GDPR.

    First and foremost, the legislation is a response to what many call “surveillance capitalism,” a business model driven in large part (but not entirely) by the rise of digital marketing. The grievance is familiar: Corporations and governments are collecting too much data about consumers and citizens, often without our express consent.  Our privacy and our “right to be left alone” are in peril. While we’ve collectively wrung our hands about this for years (I started thinking about “the Database of Intentions” back in 2001, and I offered a “Data Bill of Rights” back in 2007), it was Europe, with its particular history and sensitivities, which finally took significant and definitive action.

    While surveillance capitalism is best understood as a living system – an ecosystem made up of many different actors – there are essentially three main players when it comes to collecting and leveraging personal data. First are the Internet giants – companies like Amazon, Google, Netflix and Facebook. These companies are beloved by most consumers, and are driven almost entirely by their ability to turn the actions of their customers into data that they leverage at scale to feed their business models. These companies are best understood as “At Scale First Parties” – they have a direct relationship with their customers, and because we depend on their services, they can easily acquire consent from us to exploit our data. Ben Thompson calls these players “aggregators” – they’ve aggregated powerful first-party relationships with hundreds of millions or even billions of consumers.

    The second group are the thousands of adtech players, most notably visualized in the various Lumascapes. These are companies that have grown up in the tangled, mostly open mess of the World Wide Web, mainly in the service of the digital advertising business. They collect data on consumers’ behaviors across the Internet and sell that data to marketers in an astonishingly varied and complex ways. Most of these companies have no “first party” relationship to consumers, instead they are “third parties” – they collect their data by securing relationships with sub-scale first parties like publishers and app makers. This entire ecosystem lives in an uneasy and increasingly weak position relative to the At Scale First Parties like Google and Facebook, who have inarguably consolidated power over the digital advertising marketplace.

    Now, some say that companies such as Netflix, Amazon and Apple are not driven by an advertising model, and therefore are free of the negative externalities incumbent to players like Facebook and Google. To this argument I gently remind the reader: All at scale “first party” companies leverage personal data to drive their business, regardless of whether they have “advertising” as their core revenue stream. And there are plenty of externalities, whether positive or negative, that arise when companies use data, processing power, and algorithms to determine what you might and might not experience through their services.

    The third major player in all of this, of course, are governments. Governments collect a shit ton of data about their citizens, but despite our fantasies about the US intelligence apparatus, they’re not nearly as good at exploiting that data as are the first and third party corporate players. In fact, most governments rely heavily on corporate players to make sense of the data they control. That interplay is a story into itself, and I’m sure I’ll get into it at a later date. Suffice to say that governments, particularly democratic governments, operate in a highly regulated environment when it comes to how they can use their citizens’ data.

    But until recently, first and third party corporate entities have had pretty much free reign to do whatever they want with our data. Driven in large part by the United States’ philosophy of “hands off the Internet” – a philosophy I wholeheartedly agreed with prior to the consolidation of the Internet by massive oligarchs – corporations have been regulated mainly by Terms of Services and End User License Agreements, rarely read legal contracts which give corporations sweeping control over how customer data is used.

    This all changed with GDPR, which went into effect today. There are seven principles as laid out by the regulatory body responsible for enforcement, covering fairness, usage, storage, accuracy, accountability, and so on. All of these are important, but I’m not going to get into the details in this post (it’s already getting long, after all). What really matters is this: The intent of GDPR is to protect the privacy and rights of consumers against Surveillance Capitalism. But the reality of GDPR, as with nearly all sweeping regulation, is that it favors the At Scale First Parties, who can easily gain “consent” from the billions of consumers who use their services, and it significantly threatens the sub-scale first and third party ecosystem, who have tenuous or fleeting relationships with the consumers they indirectly serve.

    Put another way: You’re quite likely to click “I Consent” or “Yes” when a GDPR form is put in between you and your next hit of Facebook dopamine. You’re utterly unlikely to do the same when a small publisher asks for your consent via what feels like a spammy email.

    An excellent example of this power imbalance in action: Facebook kicking third-party data providers off its platform in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, conveniently using GDPR as an excuse to consolidate its power as an At Scale First Party (I wrote about this at length here).  In short: because they have the scale, resources, and first party relationships in place, At Scale First Party companies can leverage GDPR to increase their power and further protect their businesses from smaller competitors. The innovation ecosystem loses, and the tech oligarchy is strengthened.

    I’ve long held that closed, walled-garden aggregators are terrible for innovation. They starve the open web of the currencies most crucial to growth: data, attention, and revenue. In fact, nearly all “innovators” on the open web are in thrall to Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and/or Google in some way or another – they depend on them for advertising services, for ecommerce, for data processing, for distribution, and/or for actual revenue.

    In another series of posts I intend to dig into what we might do about it. But now that the early returns are in, it’s clear that GDPR, while well intentioned, has already delivered a massive and unexpected externality: Instead of limiting the reach of the most powerful players operating in the world of data, it has in fact achieved the opposite effect.

    The post GDPR Ain’t Helping Anyone In The Innovation Economy appeared first on John Battelle's Search Blog.

     
  • feedwordpress 23:50:29 on 2018/01/03 Permalink
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    My Predictions for 2018 

    The post My Predictions for 2018 appeared first on John Battelle's Search Blog.

    (cross posted from NewCo Shift)

    So many predictions from so many smart people these days. When I started doing these posts fifteen years ago, prognostication wasn’t much in the air. But a host of way-smarter-than-me folks are doing it now, and I have to admit I read them all before I sat down to do my own. So in advance, thanks to Fred, to Azeem, to Scott, and Alexis, among many others.

    So let’s get into it. Regular readers know that while I think about these predictions in the back of my mind for months, I usually just sit down and write them at one sitting. That’s what happened a year ago, when I predicted that 2017 would see the tech industry lose its charmed status. It certainly did, and nearly everyone is predicting more of the same for 2018. So I won’t focus on the entire industry this year, as much as on specific companies and trends. Here we go….

    1. Crypto/blockchain dies as a major story this year. I know, this is a silly thing to say given all the hype right now. But the Silicon Valley hype cycle is a pretty predictable thing, and while new currencies will continue to rise, fall, and make and lose tons of money, the overall narrative thrives on the new, and there’s simply too much real-but-boring work to be done right now in the space. Does anyone remember 1994? Sure, it’s the year the Mozilla team decamped from Illinois to the Valley, but it’s not the year the Web broke out as a mainstream story. That came a few years later. 2018 is a year of hard work on the problems that have kept blockchain from becoming what most of us believe it can truly become. And that kind of work doesn’t keep the public engaged all year long. Besides, everyone will be focused on much larger issues like…
    2. Donald Trump blows up. 2018 is the year it all goes down, and when it does, it will happen quickly (in terms of its inevitability) and painfully slowly (in terms of it actually resolving). This of course is a terrible thing to predict for our country, but we got ourselves into this mess, and we’ll have to get ourselves out of it. It will be the defining story of the year.
    3. Facts make a comeback. This has something to do with Trump’s failure, of course, but I think 2018 is the year the Enlightenment makes a robust return to the national conversation. Liberals will finally figure out that it’s utterly stupid to blame the “other side” for our nation’s troubles. Several viral memes will break out throughout the year focused on a core narrative of truth and fact. The 2018 elections will prove that our public is not rotten or corrupt, but merely susceptible to the same fever dreams we’ve always been susceptible to, and the fever always breaks. A rising tide of technology-driven engagement will help drive all of this. Yes, this is utterly optimistic. And yes, I can’t help being that way.
    4. Tech stocks overall have a sideways year. That doesn’t meant they don’t rise like crazy early (already happening!), but that by year’s end, all the year in review stock pieces will note that tech didn’t drive the markets in the way they have over the past few years. This is because the Big Four have some troubles this coming year….
    5. Amazon becomes a target. Amazon is the most overscrutinized yet still misunderstood company in all of tech. For years it’s built a muscular and opaque platform, and in 2017 it benefitted from the fact that, so far anyway, Russians haven’t found a way to use e-commerce to disrupt western democracy. Yes, Trump seems to have a bug up his bum about the company, but his tweets last year seemed to only increase Amazon’s teflon reputation with the rest of society. In 2018, however, things will change for the worse. The company is smart enough to keep hiding its power — it hasn’t accumulated the cash of its GAFA rivals, nor does it play (as much) in the high profile worlds of media and politics. But by 2018, the company will find itself painted into something of a box. Last year I thought the fear of automation and job losses would dominate the political discussion, but Russia managed to eclipse those concerns. This is the year Amazon becomes the poster child for future shock. In particular, I expect the company’s “Flex” business to come under serious scrutiny. And what it’s doing with in house brands is the equivalent of Google giving preference to its own products in search results (that hasn’t worked out so well in Europe). Further tarnishing its image will be its lack of leadership on social issues — Jeff Bezos is no Tim Cook when it comes to empathy. By year’s end, Amazon’s reputation will be in jeopardy. Then again, I do think the company will be nimbler than most in responding to that threat.
    6. Google/Alphabet will have a terrible first half (reputation wise), but recover after that. Why a terrible first half? Well, I agree with Scott, there’s another shoe to drop in the whole Schmidt story, not to mention more EU fines and fake news fallout, and that will kick off a soul-searching first half for the search giant. The company will find itself flat-footed and in need of some traditional corporate revival tactics — ever since Page stepped back into the obscurity of Alphabet, the company has lacked a compelling overarching narrative. I’m not sure how the company recovers its mojo, but it could be by pushing deeper into a strategy of letting its children grow up outside the Alphabet conglomerate structure. Perhaps not a government driven breakup, per se, but a series of spin outs, led by Sundar Pichai (Google), Susan Wojcicki (YouTube), and perhaps a new spinout around Doubleclick/Adtech, possibly run by Neal Mohan. Alphabet will remain as a holding company with stakes in all these newly (or soon to be newly) public companies, as well as a place that incubates new ventures and figures out what the hell to do with Nest.
    7. Facebook. Ah, what to say about Facebook. Well, let’s just say the company muddles through a slog of a year, with a lot of rearguard work politically, even as it starts to dawn on the world that maybe, just maybe, every advertiser in the world doesn’t want to be handcuffed to the company’s toxic engagement model. Of course, with YouTube in particular, Google has this issue as well, so here’s my Facebook prediction, which is more of an ad industry prediction: The Duopoly falls out of favor. No, this doesn’t mean year-on-year declines in revenue, but it does mean a falloff in year-on-year growth, and by the end of 2018, a increasingly vocal contingent of influencers inside the advertising world will speak out against the companies (they’re already speaking to me privately about it). One or two of them will publicly cut their spending and move it to other places, like programmatic (which will have a sideways year more than likely) and places like….
    8. Pinterest breaks out. This one might prove my biggest whiff, or my biggest “nailed it,” hard to say. But for more, see my piece from earlier in the weekAdvertisers will find comfort in Pinterest’s relatively uncontroversial model, and its increasingly good results. The big question is whether Pinterest can both scale its inventory in a predictable and contextual way, and whether it can make its self service/API-based platform super simple to use. Oh, and of course continue to attract a growing user base. Early signs are that it’s doing all three.
    9. Autonomous vehicles do not become mainstream. I’ve said it before, I’m saying it again: This shit is complicated, and we’re not even close to ready. We’ll see a lot of cool pilots, and maybe even one (probably small) city will vote to let them run amuck. But I just don’t see it happening this year. However, I do think 2018 will be the year that electric vehicles are accepted as inevitable.
    10. Business leads. Business doesn’t change by fiat, it changes through the slow uptake of new social norms. And a crucial new norm in business poised to have a breakout year is the expectation that companies take their responsibilities to all stakeholders as seriously as they take their duty to shareholders“All stakeholders” means more than customers and employees, it means actually adding value to society beyond just their product or service. 2018 will be the year of “positive externalities” in business, and yes, NewCo will be there to take notes on those companies who manage to live up to this new normal. A good place to start, of course, is the Shift Forum in less than two months. I hope to see you there, and have a great 2018!

    The post My Predictions for 2018 appeared first on John Battelle's Search Blog.

     
  • feedwordpress 19:28:05 on 2017/12/19 Permalink
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    Predictions 2017 – How’d I Do This Year? 

    The post Predictions 2017 – How’d I Do This Year? appeared first on John Battelle's Search Blog.

    Every year, I make predictions, and every year, I score myself. As I wrote nearly 12 months ago, 2017 felt particularly unpredictable. As it turns out, my musings were often on target. Except when they weren’t…

    I’ve played with all manners of scoring over the years, but this year I’m going with a straight zero to ten rating. Zero if I whiffed entirely, ten if I hit it out of the park, and some kind of partial credit in between. Then add ‘em up, divide by the number of predictions, and that’ll be my overall batting average.

    So let’s see how I did. I made ten predictions, so to each in turn….

    #1: The bloom comes off the tech industry rose. I believe I hit this one out of the park. The backlash is at such a fever pitch, it seems tech has been crucified forever, but I peg the beginning of the end at Susan Fowler’s astonishing takedown of Uber, which was posted in mid February of 2017. Not only did her revelations precipitate the fall of Travis Kalanick and set the tone for the #MeToo movement in tech, it also gave the press an antagonist it could truly villainize, which set the stage for later takedowns of Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple. Multiple books (the FourWorld Without Mind, etc) piled on, as did the Russia/Facebook sh*tshow (and hearings), and the concerns of former tech engineers like Tristan Harris, whose “Time Well Spent” movement broke out in 2017. Overall, it was one hell of a bad year for tech (and to be honest, tech brought it on itself), and my words in January certainly rang true: “2017 will be the year the industry is cast as a villain — for its ravenous and largely opaque data collection practices, its closed and self-serving approach to its own platforms, and its refusal to acknowledge or address the very real externalities…created by its products and services.”Score: 10 of 10.

    #2: The conversation economy breaks out. This one is harder to judge. You may recall that a year ago, chatbots were all the rage, and voice-based interfaces like Alexa and Google Home were a novelty. One year later, chatbots have faded (but “appbots” are on the rise), and voice-driven systems have secured a place in our shared culture. That was a fast rise, comparatively speaking. In my post, I wrote: “Combine smart chat with voice, and … well, we’ll start to see a new UX for the web.” I still think that’s true, and we’ve had a year of very promising developments. But was it a breakout year? History alone will tell. Score: 5 of 10.

    #3. Open starts to win again. Oh boy. Every year I have what you might call an aspirational post, in that I very much hope it will come true, but I’m pretty sure it won’t come true. What I do know, however, is that in 2017, the table was well and truly set for open approaches to make a comeback. The reason? Well, see #1: Tech’s gotten too big, and too powerful, and the best way to dissemble that power is a swing back to open data (see this post for more). I remain firmly convinced that open is on the rise. But I don’t have much proof that 2017 is the year that trend began “to win again.” I wrote a year ago: “This year won’t be a turning point in this battle, but it will show meaningful progress.” It’s true that Amazon, Google, and Apple managed to settle their differences, and Microsoft Cortana laid down with Alexa, (and this) but…a dramatic proof of my thesis did not emerge this year. Score: 4 of 10.

    #4. Privacy will become a strong product category. I didn’t exactly predict the Equifax, Verizon, Uber, and scores of other data breaches which occurred this year, but they certainly reinforced my premise for prediction #4: Privacy is now front and center for all businesses and consumers. The question remains, however, if anyone will actually make a decent product suite that protects our privacy. Certainly in the business to business realm, privacy as a product boomed this year (there’s not a board in the world that didn’t authorize more spend for security this year). But last year I wrote: “But fear of cyber warfare, fraud, and over-reaching marketers and government will create huge openings for consumer friendly versions of currently opaque products like PGP, password managers, and the like.” Well, the openings are there. But the products? Not so much. Yet. Score: 7 of 10.

    #5. Adtech has a ripper of a year. OK, there has to be one that was pretty much a whiff, and this one is likely it. I am still an adtech bull, and the market still grew, if mainly led by Facebook, Amazon, and Google. But the independent adtech business did not have a ripper of a year, instead, it was a year of retrenching, mostly. Yes, good growth and strong business, but not the breakout I had predicted. Score: 2 of 10.

    #6. Apple releases a truly bad hardware product. Damn, if only Apple hadn’t pulled its HomePod product this year! Because if it had actually released it, it would have laid a massive egg, I’m sure of it (the company simply does not have the AI, voice recognition, and software chops). Instead, Apple was wise enough to realize it had a dud on its hand, and delayed what would have been a stinker of a consumer product. I even predicted it would be the HomePod that lays the egg…maybe someone at Apple reads me? In any case, I think I should get partial credit here, because besides predicting a bad release (the Watch release was pretty bumpy, after all), I also predicted 2017 would be the year the press turns on Apple, and that Apple would respond by acting like a typical corporation (repatriating cash to curry favor, buying companies to enter new markets, etc). It’s well on its way to doing just that (just bought Shazam, for example, and isn’t exactly fighting the tax bill). Score: 6 of 10.

    #7. A Fortune 100 company will announce its intention to become a B Corp. Nope. Wishful thinking. Despite Paul Polman *sounding* like the CEO of a B Corp on Twitter all year long, this did not happen. Move along, nothing to see here. Score: 0 out of 10.

    #8. President Trump leaves Twitter. Ha! He was kicked off by a mischeivious contractor, for ten whole minutes! I was…wrong. It’s true, debate did rage about why the president *should* be kicked off, and there’s still a few days left for Trump to decide he’s bigger than the blue bird, but besides that technicality, for which I am giving myself at least partial credit, this did not happen. SAD! Score: 2 of 10

    #9. Snap soars — then sours. This is where a picture is worth a thousand words:

    Score: 10 of 10.

    10. Human connection commands a premium in the workforce. In this prediction I also wrote: “In 2017, we’ll come to realize that we’re valuing the wrong things, and start a conversation about paying people to connect with each other — because if we can automate the other stuff, why the heck wouldn’t we value each other more?! Related: The conversation around Universal Basic Income (or my preferred term, the Citizens’ Dividend) will become white hot.” So it’s complicated, but I think overall the conversation around the future of work and UBI did become white hot, and we did see a marked shift toward valuing human connection in the workplace. However, it’s rather hard for me to prove that inside of just this year. As with a few of my predictions, only time will tell. So I’ll score myself a partial win on this one. Score: 6 of 10.


    So pulling back, how did I do, overall? Two whiffs (Adtech, B Corps), two home runs (tech backlash, Snap), three that were largely wins, one push, and two that were partial credit. Better than 50% — a score of 52 on a total of 100 points. Not terrible — about average over my nearly 15 years of doing this, stellar if you’re a major leaguer (of course, an “F” without a curve…). Regardless, I always have fun both making these predictions, and scoring myself against them twelve months later. I am honored that you take time to read my work, and I’ll be back early in the new year with predictions for 2018. Util then, have a great holiday season, everybody!

    Related:

    Predictions 2017

    Predictions 2016

    2016: How I Did

    Predictions 2015

    2015: How I Did

    Predictions 2014

    2014: How I Did

    Predictions 2013

    2013: How I Did

    Predictions 2012

    2012: How I Did

    Predictions 2011

    2011: How I Did

    Predictions 2010

    2010: How I Did

    2009 Predictions

    2009 How I Did

    2008 Predictions

    2008 How I Did

    2007 Predictions

    2007 How I Did

    2006 Predictions

    2006 How I Did

    2005 Predictions

    2005 How I Did

    2004 Predictions

    2004 How I Did

    The post Predictions 2017 – How’d I Do This Year? appeared first on John Battelle's Search Blog.

     
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